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Establishing the Future State of 
the Peacebuilding Commission 
Perspectives on Africa
Kwesi Aning and Ernest Lartey 
Preface  From the Project Director 
At the 2005 World Summit in New York City, member states of the 
United Nations agreed to create “a dedicated institutional mechanism 
to address the special needs of countries emerging from conflict to-
wards recovery, reintegration and reconstruction and to assist them in 
laying the foundation for sustainable development”. That new mecha-
nism was the UN Peacebuilding Commission and two associated bod-
ies: a Peacebuilding Support Office and a Peacebuilding Fund. To-
gether, these new entities have been characterized as the UN’s new 
peacebuilding architecture, or PBA. 
 
This Working Paper is one of nine essays that examine the possible 
future role of the UN’s peacebuilding architecture. They were written 
as part of a project co-organized by the Centre for International Policy 
Studies at the University of Ottawa and the Norwegian Institute of  
International Affairs. All of the contributors to the project were asked 
to identify realistic but ambitious “stretch targets” for the Peacebuild-
ing Commission and its associated bodies over the next five to ten 
years. The resulting Working Papers, including this one, seek to 
stimulate fresh thinking about the UN’s role in peacebuilding.  
 
The moment is ripe for such rethinking: During 2010, the UN will re-
view the performance of the PBA to date, including the question of 
whether it has achieved its mandated objectives. Most of the contribu-
tors to this project believe that the PBA should pursue a more ambi-
tious agenda over the next five years. While the PBC and its associ-
ated bodies have succeeded in carving out a niche for themselves, that 
niche remains a small one. Yet the need for more focused international 
attention, expertise, and coordinated and sustained assistance towards 
war-torn countries is undiminished. It remains to be seen whether UN 
officials and the organization’s member states will rise to the chal-
lenge of delivering on the PBA’s initial promise over the next five 
years and beyond, but doing so will at least require a vision of what 
the PBA can potentially accomplish in this period. The Working  
Papers produced in this project are intended to provide grist for this 
visioning effort. 
 
Roland Paris 
Ottawa, January 2010 
Summary 
The paper discusses the strategic role of the PBC as a vital component 
in the attainment of the new peacebuilding vision and architecture and 
examines its potential implications for sustainable peace in Africa. 
Furthermore, it examines the various dimensions of peace-building 
strategies by evaluating what has been achieved so far. In reviewing 
the PBC’s peace-building approaches, analysis is undertaken to iden-
tify specific gaps in the current methods of operation. Consequently, 
an analysis of the expected strategic changes that should reflect the 
future outlook of the PBC’s engagement in Africa is developed that 
categorizes the potential strategic changes that should occur in the 
future. Three main areas are identified as being crucial in attaining 
both the objectives of the PBC and visioning its future, namely: (a) a 
need for regionally integrated dimensions of peace building; (b)  
understanding and appreciating the context of international politics in 
peace building; and (c) having a nuanced and differentiated grasp of 
the potential transformative impact of peace building in Africa. These 
are the critical dimensions of the PBC’s future outlook in Africa. 
However, in working towards attaining the envisioned future, critical 
care must be taken to: 
 
 Neutralize the potential tensions that may ensue between re-
gional and national ownership of peace-building programs; 
 Distinguish the possible sources of strategic outcomes between 
regional and national impacts and its likely implications for 
capacity building, resource mobilization and impact sustain-
ability; and 
 Engage Africa’s regional and continental institutions in identi-
fying and defining response mechanisms. 
 
 
 
Background 
Africa is often perceived and described as the poorest and most con-
flict-prone region in the world. As a result of its continued state of po-
litical instability, its scarce resources are often channeled to respond to 
insecurity and for conflict resolution activities. This detracts from 
providing attention for the provision of essential services. This relates 
to the question of how best to coordinate the transition from conflict to 
sustainable peace and development. Furthermore, considerably more 
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needs to be done in terms of strategies and policy coherence to achie-
ve durable peace and also to prevent a relapse into conflict in areas 
where conflicts have occurred.1 Indeed, the question of state instability 
in Africa raises concerns about the nature of political governance in 
Africa. These concerns are articulated in this paper partly as the un-
charted paradoxes of Africa’s political necessities.  
 
Peace building is practiced largely on the assumption that the causes 
of state failure lie in the rapid establishment of –‘nation-states’– im-
posed by external players. It is argued that “the phenomenon of the 
weak and ultimately failed states is …above all a problem of the pre-
sent system of international relations.”2  The implicit assumption here 
is that, it is the Westphalian state closely related to the colonial and 
post-colonial processes in Africa that partially account for state fail-
ure. While state collapse has been a common feature in Africa’s politi-
cal process, it became more manifestly evidenced by the scores of 
armed conflicts that devastated the continent in the 1980’s and be-
yond. While solutions were sought at the political level to address 
these conditions of state fragility and collapse in Africa, the pervasive 
political instability caused the region to initiate different forms of 
adaptive political transitions. The Organization of African Unity 
(OAU) for example, metamorphosed through a number of institutional 
processes into the African Union (AU). Starting with the Sirte Decla-
ration in 1999, for instance, it ushered in a new vision for institutional 
change that led to the transformation of the OAU into the AU with a 
Constitutive Act adopted in 2000. As part of the transitory nature of 
these institutional reforms to respond to Africa’s security challenges, 
the Commission of the AU was transformed into an African Union 
Authority in February 2009. But even more crucial in this transforma-
tional exercise of the AU was the establishment of its Peace and Secu-
rity architecture which has improved the AU’s options to engage more 
directly in conflict situations and contribute to sustainable peace building 
in a more coordinated, holistic and strategic manner.3 To compliment the 
AU’s efforts, it’s Regional Economic Communities (RECs) such as 
Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the Eco-
nomic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)4 have also de-
                                                 
1 Collier, Paul, Anke Hoeffler and Mans Soderbom, Post-Conflict Risks, (Centre for the 
Study of African Economies. 2006), Working Paper Series paper 256. 
2 Wolfgang, Heinrich and Manfred Kulessa, Destruction of States as an Opportunity for 
New Statism? The Example of Somalia and Somaliland’. In  Hippler, Jochen (ed.), Na-
tional-Building. A Key Concept for Peaceful Conflict Transformation? (Pluto Press: Lon-
don, 2005). 
3 Aning, Kwesi, Africa Union’s Peace and Security Architecture: Defining an Emerging 
Response Mechanism. (Uppsala: The Nordic African Institute, 2008). 
4 See Agbo, Osita, West Africa’s Trouble Spots and the Imperative for Peacebuilding, (Da-
kar: Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa (CODESRIA), 
2006). 
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veloped their own security mechanisms to significantly improve 
peace-building activities in their respective regions.5   
 
Apart from the AU and its RECs’ role in conflict resolution and peace 
building in Africa, there are other key actors who also operate at the 
bilateral and multilateral levels such as Non-Governmental Organiza-
tions (NGOs), International Non-governmental Organizations (IN-
GOs) and the International Financial Institutions (IFIs) who continue 
to make crucial contributions to the post-conflict reconstruction of 
countries in Africa. But the presence of these bilateral and multilateral 
arrangements outside the AU and RECs’ structures means that their 
operations occur without any strategic coordination among them as 
each of these actors operate independently of each other. Moreover, 
all these actors often operate under different conditions which are  
often difficult to align with goals of other actors directly or indirectly 
operating in various peace-building missions.6 The challenge has been 
to find the most appropriate synergies to streamline such activities in 
order to achieve a common vision. The United Nations (UN) cluster 
and lead agency approach was widely adopted to serve this coordinat-
ing purpose in the humanitarian and peace-building missions but the 
concept was largely restricted to the internal organizational structures 
of the UN agencies.7   
 
Significantly though, the United Nations (UN) takes the overall re-
sponsibility of ensuring the maintenance of international peace and 
security and more importantly, it takes appropriate measures within 
the framework of the UN Charter to restore peace and security to con-
flict situations.8 But the critical issue that keeps recurring as lacking in 
the UN’s overarching responsibilities in most post-conflict peace-
building responses is the overall strategic approach and coherence 
with which it applies resources in such operations to achieve the de-
sired outcomes.9 This strategic approach to peace-building challenges 
was subsequently to be given greater attention by the UN starting 
2005.10  
                                                 
5 Particularly for the Economic Community of West African States, see its ECOWAS Con-
flict Prevention Framework, www.ecowas.int/publications/en/framework/ECPF_final.pdf. 
Accessed: 31 August, 2009. 
6 . Eide, Espen Barth, From Peacekeeping to Peacebuilding. (FIIA Report. 2006). 7. 
7 See Holmes Homes, “Humanitarian Action: A Western-Dominated Enterprise in Need of 
Change”.  http://www.fmreview.org/FMRpdfs/FMR29/4-5.pdf   
Accessed: 31 August, 2009.  
8 See UN, “United Nations Charter “, (UN, 1945).   
9 UN, “Report of the Peacebuilding Commission in its First Session”, 2007. 
10 See paragraph 97 of the “2005 World Summit Outcome” document. A/RES/60/1, UN; 
Rugumamu, Severine, M. 2009. Does the UN Peacebuilding Commission Change the 
Mode of Peacebuilding in Africa?. Dialogue on Globalisation. Briefing Papers. (New 
York: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung); See UN, 2008. Report of the Secretary-General on the 
Peacebuilding Fund. A/63/218-S2008/522. Established in December, 2005 as part of the 
internal reform agenda of the UN, the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) ushered in a re-
newed commitment by the international community to take charge of peacebuilding ac-
tivities in a more coordinated approach. Its creation was in direct response to the lack of 
strategic perspectives to the overall coordination of peacebuilding interventions in post-
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In this paper we discuss the strategic role of the PBC as a vital com-
ponent in the attainment of the vision as set out in the new peace-
building architecture and its potential implications for sustainable  
peace in Africa. The subsequent sections examine various dimensions 
of peace building in Africa. After evaluating peace-building strategies 
in Africa, a review of the PBC’s peace-building approaches is under-
taken to identify specific gaps in the current methods of operation 
with specific reference to Africa. An analysis of the expected strategic 
changes that should reflect the future outlook of the PBC is developed 
in a separate section that, categorizes the strategic changes that should 
occur in the future in three main areas, namely: regionally integrated 
dimensions of peace building; international politics in peace building; 
and transformative impact of peace building in Africa. These are pre-
sented as the critical dimensions of the PBC’s future outlook in  
Africa. The conditions that should prevail in order to attain the envi-
sioned future are also discussed in greater length in the last section of 
the paper.  
 
 
 
Peace-building Strategies in Africa 
Establishing the appropriate political framework that will make the 
vision of sustainable peace building achievable especially in Africa 
remains a dilemma that the international community will continue to 
grapple with for a long while. It will be an exercise of complete futil-
ity to conceive a vision for an entity such as the PBC existing in a  
political vacuum. One of the strategic ways to have a workable vision 
in any developmental setting is to create an environment, which is 
conducive enough to safeguard the desired impact of the envisioned 
future. At both bilateral and multilateral levels, the responsibility of 
identifying long-term goals for any executable task lies largely within 
the domain of political governance. This means that if the political 
framework at the state level is premised on a wrong footing, the stra-
tegic vision of that state is bound to fail. Thus the political process 
within states and inter-governmental bodies should define how far the 
significance of a peace-building vision can impact on society. Strate-
gic vision requires long-term political will for execution. There is also 
the need to mobilize adequate resources and coordinate strategies for 
                                                 
conflict countries, and has, as its main objective, the responsibility to ensure a concerted 
action by both UN and non-UN actors and also to mobilize bilateral and multilateral fi-
nancial resources for sustainable peace. Four years into its routine operations, the PBC 
seem to be on course in its quest to ensuring sustainable peace and development, espe-
cially in Africa where most of its activities are concentrated. However, it is still grappling 
with the challenge of carving a long-term vision around which its strategic objectives and 
operations can be anchored. 
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such vision to become real. Hence, the political will, as always, pro-
vides direction for the attainment of the vision, while resources pro-
vide the necessary push for the execution of the vision, and the strat-
egy determines the approach used to follow the direction set out in the 
political framework to achieve the vision.  
 
At the global level, the United Nations has the responsibility to set out 
strategic vision for the world. Since the end of the Second World War, 
the maintenance of international peace and security has fully been en-
trusted in the hands of the UN. But the UN’s responsibility of rebuild-
ing the post-war inter-state era failed to anticipate the likely threats 
that were to be ensued as a result of lack of attention and appropriate 
strategies to prevent the internal dynamics of fragile states from laps-
ing or relapsing into conflicts. The strategic drift in fashioning out a 
coherent peace-building vision for the world rather impacted ad-
versely on Africa and since the 1980s the continent has experienced 
incoherent peace-building approaches, exacerbated by the continues 
ascendancy of conflict patterns in the region.11 
 
The failure of the international community to envisioning a coherent 
peace-building strategy to address the new challenges in post-war re-
construction became a key issue within UN circles, prompting the 
former UN Secretary-General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, to outline what 
then became known as “An Agenda for Peace”  in 1992. One of the 
key intentions in “An Agenda for Peace” was to have an integrated 
vision in peace-building approaches to both fragile and post-conflict 
societies. It was conceptualized as a set of actions taken to “identify 
and support structures which tend to strengthen and solidify peace 
[and] to avoid a relapse into conflict.”12 The goal of peace building 
was integrated into the conventional conflict resolution mechanism 
that ideally enforces a schematic conflict management strategy that 
logically flows from preventative diplomacy, peacemaking, and 
peacekeeping to peace building. The utility of peace building had a 
uni-dimensional role of ensuring that post-conflict states do not re-
lapse into conflict after a resolution has been found. This understand-
ing of a peace-building outcome is further corroborated by the concept 
of the “Responsibility to Protect (R2P)” which emphasizes the collec-
tive responsibility of states to rebuild post-conflict societies.13 The 
R2P norm requires commitments from both states and the interna-
                                                 
11 De Coning H. Cedric, ‘Coherence and Coordination in the United Nations and Integrated 
Missions: A Norwegian Perspective’, Security in Practice No. 5, (Norwegian Institute of 
International Affairs. 2007). 
12 UN,  An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peacekeeping. Re-
port of the Secretary-General, UN Doc. A/47/277-S/24111, (New York: United Nations, 
17 June, 1992):  21.  
13 See Aning, K & Samuel Atuobi, ‘Responsibility to Protect in Africa: An Analysis of the 
African Union’s Peace and Security Architecture’ Journal of the Global Responsibility to 
Protect, Vol. 1, No. 1. (2009). 
Establishing the Future of the Peacebuilding Commission 9 
tional community to do more in protecting populations from extreme 
conditions of harm triggered by excessive political arbitrariness and 
violent conflict of which Africa has tragically been  a key example.  
 
While the R2P norm views peace building as a strategic exercise to 
prevent a reoccurrence of conflict in fragile and post-conflict societies, 
it essentially locates the peace-building function in the post-conflict 
resolution phase.  Peace building, therefore, becomes an event in post-
conflict state-building rather than serving as process of building sus-
tainable peace and development, thus perpetuating the state-centric 
tradition of peace building which was always pervasive in the Cold 
War era.  
 
To understand Africa’s conflict context, Richard Dowden describes 
the conflict puzzles of African “reputation”, in which the African “re-
putation” is often cast in the indivisible realities of poverty, diseases 
and war.14 The “reputation” of Africa seeks to convey an argument, 
supportive of the fact that post-war peace building must integrate the-
se factors in both physical and structural violence. The reason why 
these three conditions are rife in Africa is partly due to lack of inte-
grated and comprehensive analysis of, and approaches to conflict reso-
lution and peace-building mechanisms. For now, the international 
community’s concern is about its obsession with the war component 
of Richard Dowden’s conflict equation, thus ignoring the key aspects 
of poverty and diseases since they do not exhibit direct manifestations 
of physical violence. Hence the structural violence of disasters, pov-
erty and diseases which are frequent occurrences and conflict accel-
erators in Africa are ignored in peace resolution processes, and there-
fore does not become a preoccupation of peace-building interventions. 
The effect is that the strategic value of the need to understand the 
“hard” and “soft” elements of conflict, which is required to create sus-
tainable peace-building strategies are often compromised, leading to 
the designing of “blueprint strategies that tend to look like shopping 
lists.”15 More critically, there is the “need to better take into account 
‘soft’ elements such as trust, confidence, legitimacy and cooperation 
that form the fabric of [African] society” in peace building.16 A key 
point to note in this regard is that if peace-building strategies are de-
signed to focus only on the physical aspects of conflicts - as it is pres-
ently the case in Africa - then one will not be far from right to remark 
that only half-hearted solutions and defective peace-building strategies 
are currently being deployed to address peace-building challenges in 
                                                 
14  Dowden, Richard, Africa: Altered States, Ordinary Miracles. (London: Portobello Books 
Ltd, 2009). 
15 See the report of the Peacebuilding Roundtable, titled: Bringing Research Perspectives to 
Inform the UN’s Peacebuilding Work.  International Development Research Centre, the 
Peacebuilding Support Office and the Carnegie Corporation of (New York, Ottawa, De-
cember 10-11, 2008).   
16 Ibid. 
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Africa, and the suitability and sustainability of such incongruous 
strategies in the future remains highly uncertain.  
 
Despite the numerous political challenges facing Africa, the AU con-
tinues to serve as the champion of regional peace and stability. It has 
undertaken a number of steps aimed at transforming its political struc-
tures and agendas in order to position it strategically, becoming more 
relevant in, and responsive to current security challenges. Some of the 
steps taken have had significant impact on peace-building strategies in 
Africa, and have also evolved a new vision that is directed towards the 
promotion of good governance, rule of law, human rights protection 
and development. The New Partnership for Africa’s Development 
(NEPAD) programme evolved in response to the stark reality of not 
being able to effectively coordinate the components of political gov-
ernance, security sector stabilization, poverty reduction and develop-
ment programmes. As a single collective vision for Africa’s develop-
ment since 2006, the NEPAD programme has been designated as a 
special agency of the AU and is partly charged with the responsibility 
of “supporting post-conflict reconstruction and mobilization of re-
sources for the AU Peace Fund.”17 
 
Even though, the AU Peace Fund has existed since 2002 and continu-
es to support the peace-building activities of the AU, little is known 
about how it is linked with the UN Peacebuilding Fund. Much remains 
to be seen how these two bodies take steps to streamline their inter-
ventions in Africa. While recognizing that the AU Peace Fund and the 
UN Peacebuilding Fund have similar, if not the same, orientation to 
peace building, it will be more commendable should they work in 
ways that are more complementary than duplicative of each others ef-
forts. Given that the PBC has been mandated to, as it were, draw in-
ternational attention to peace building in many diverse respects of 
post-conflict considerations, and also having the endorsement of the 
UN to mobilize financial resources to operate the Peacebuilding Fund 
from resources generated from the donor community, there is the  
potential of this strategic role undermining the usefulness and effec-
tiveness of the AU Peace Fund. One critical challenge regarding this 
issue is that since the two bodies generate their operational resources 
from the same or similar development partners to source for funding 
to operate their Funds, there could be unhealthy competition arising 
between them which may culminate in non-cooperation between both 
bodies. This may even lead to a division in the ranks of the donors 
with one group deciding to go with the PBF, the other group going 
with the AU Peace Fund, and the third option being bilateral with the 
individual countries while the fourth group may decide to stay indif-
                                                 
17  John Akokpari, The African Union and Its Institutions, (Centre for Conflict Resolution, 
2008). 
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ferent from the three options that may have been created as a result of 
the unhealthy competition between the PBF and AU Peace Fund. In 
the end, the very purpose for which the PBC was established may be 
defeated by its own failures to recognize existing parallel structures 
and streamlining its operations with them. 
 
A key element of the AU’s increasing role in peacebuilding is its pol-
icy framework on Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development 
(PCRD) which was adopted in 2006. The PCRD framework outlines a 
number of key areas where the AU will focus its peacebuilding re-
sponses. The PCRD framework consists, first and foremost, of five 
key principles that underpin action across all post-conflict reconstruc-
tion and development programmes. The principles are: African Lead-
ership; National and Local Ownership; Inclusiveness, Equity and 
Non-Discrimination; Cooperation and Coherence; and Capacity Build-
ing for Sustainability.18 The framework also contains six indicative 
elements that are “self-standing and cross-cutting”, representing the 
key pillars upon which all PCRD efforts will be based. The indicators 
are the following: Security; humanitarian/Emergency Assistance;  
Political Governance and Transition; Socio-Economic Reconstruction 
and Development; Human Rights, Justice and Reconciliation; and 
Women and Gender.19 The framework also has provisions for resource 
mobilization and processes, including key actors and governance 
mechanisms.20 
 
With this, a comprehensive peacebuilding architecture has been de-
veloped by the AU, but the critical question is; will the AU be able to 
carry out these fine ideas if need be? While it is important to have an 
architecture to deal with post-conflict peacebuilding challenges, it is 
even more crucial to develop the operational mechanisms to make it 
work. Currently, such operational structures do not exist and are not 
functional at the continental level.” 
 
 
 
The PBC and Current Peace-building 
Strategies in Africa 
The Peacebuilding Architecture (PBA) adopts an Integrated Peace-
building Strategy (IPS) to carry out its national programmes. The IPS 
                                                 
18  African Union, Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development (PCRD) Policy, (African 
Union Commission. 2007), 6. 
19  African Union, 7. 
20  African Union,12. 
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is the grand scheme that coordinates the different actors and integrates 
national priorities and goals for each sponsored country. Even though 
the IPS is a common strategy for all participating countries, it allows 
individual countries to exercise some level of flexibility in determin-
ing their goals and priorities. However, the IPS does not allow for in-
ter-country integration which is a major challenge in the way the 
peacebuilding architecture is organized. The Working Group on Les-
sons Learned is designed to address this challenge but it has not been 
able to achieve this level of regional coordination to a large extent. 21  
 
In order to make integration of peace-building activities in post-
conflict environment less cumbersome and complicated, the Peace-
building Fund has established three operational windows through 
which funds are channeled and disbursed for specific peace-building 
activities. These three windows were set up in order to address spe-
cific needs and priorities of countries that are earmarked for interna-
tional support by the UN.  
 
Window I: Countries before the Peacebuilding Commission. The 
countries in this cluster are Burundi, Sierra Leone and Guinea Bissau. 
 
Window II: Comprises countries declared eligible for Fund support by 
the Secretary-General. They include: Central African Republic, Co-
moros, Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea, Liberia and Nepal  
 
Window III: Emergency window. Countries in the “Emergency Win-
dow” include: Côte d’Ivoire, the Central African Republic, Guinea, 
Liberia, Burundi, Haiti and Kenya.22  
 
The countries that are currently sponsored under Window I are per-
ceived to have a longer-term programme with the PBC. Such coun-
tries have national integrated programmes in peace building but are 
not strategically coordinated with each other in their various regions. 
The effect is that despite the expected peace-building benefits that will 
accrue at the national levels, the net-impact of such benefits at the re-
gional level may not significantly be sustainable in the long-run.  
 
A comparative analysis of programme areas in Burundi and Sierra Le-
one, for instance depicts that the PBC focuses on key areas of post-
conflict peace building categorized as: Security Sectors Reform;  
Democracy and Good Governance; Human Rights and Land Reform. 
In Burundi, a total of US$27.9 million was disbursed on 15 projects as 
of May 2008. The distribution of priorities is given as: security sector- 
                                                 
21 See UN, Report of the Peacebuilding Commission on its Second Session. A/63/92- 
S/2008/417, (New York, 2008).  
22 UN, Report of the Secretary-General on the Peacebuilding Fund. A/63/218- S2008/522. 
(New York, 2008). 
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46 percent; democracy and good governance- 43.6 percent; human 
rights- 7.9 percent; and property and land issues- 2.5 percent. On the 
other hand, a total of US$ 15.7 million was spent within the same pe-
riod in Sierra Leone on 7 approved projects in the following priority 
sectors: Justice and Security- 64.5 percent; Youth Employment and 
Empowerment- 25.5 percent; and Democracy and Good Governance- 
10 percent.23 The distribution of peace-building programmes between 
these two countries shows the existence of internal dynamics and 
flexibility in determining peace-building responses, aided by the IPS 
for the participating countries. But while the idea of allowing flexibil-
ity in setting local priorities is appropriate to promote local ownership, 
it does indicate an overbearing inclination to prioritize security factors 
over and above other equally important development priorities. In 
both Burundi and Sierra Leone, for instance the security sector alone 
takes over 40 percent of the entire peace-building budget. Such a pat-
tern of prioritization may not be sustainable in the long-term.    
 
There are as many as five West African countries, namely: Sierra  
Leone, Guinea Bissau, Liberia, Côte d’Ivoire and Guinea currently 
participating in peace-building activities under the UN Peacebuilding 
Architecture (PBA). This makes it more strategic for the PBC to adopt 
regional approaches to its peace-building responses in Africa. Already 
ECOWAS, for example has adopted a number of mechanisms and in-
struments for regional peacekeeping, peace enforcement and peace-
building activities, such as the Protocol for the establishment of a 
Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peace-
keeping and Security, the Protocol on Democracy and Good Govern-
ance and the 2008 ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework (CPF).24 
These mechanisms and the lessons learned from peace support experi-
ences by ECOWAS in Sierra Leone, Liberia, Guinea Bissau and Cote 
d’Ivoire have made significant contributions to the formulation of an 
overarching ECOWAS peace and security architecture that makes co-
ordination of joint initiatives in West Africa more integrated. Given 
the fact that ECOWAS and PBC both have shared interests in, espe-
cially Sierra Leone and Guinea Bissau, including Cote d’Ivoire, and 
with the presence of United Nations Office for West Africa 
(UNOWA) based in Dakar, Senegal, it will be more prudent to have 
shared vision and integrated strategy in peace building between these 
key peace-building actors within the sub-region.25 
 
                                                 
23 UN, “Report of the Secretary-General on the Peacebuilding Fund,” 13. 
24 See Peacebuilding Support Office, “Promoting Collaboration and Improving Coordination 
between the PBC and Regional and Sub-Regional Organisation: A Briefing by ECOWAS 
and the OAS”. Peacebuilding Commission Working Group on Lessons Learned, 2009.   
25 For a discussion of the work by ECOWAS and UNOWA, see Aning, K & A, Sarjoh Bah. 
ECOWAS and Conflict Prevention: Confronting the Triple threats’ Centre on Interna-
tional Cooperation, (New York University: 2009). 
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Peace-building Interventions in Africa 
A majority of African countries are currently in a phase requiring one 
form of peace-building need or the other. This is because peace build-
ing is considered in this context as addressing both physical and struc-
tural conflict factors that inhibit the progress of state building in  
Africa. The level of state fragility in Africa varies in degrees and  
scope of security threats that prevails in specific countries.  
 
There are five clusters of peace-building priorities in Africa as indi-
cated in the Table 1 below. The more one goes down the table, the less 
physical conflicts become and hence the greater the need to adopt a 
more comprehensive and strategic approaches to peace building. It 
also means that integrated and coordinated strategies with regional 
and long-term perspectives will facilitate the work of the PBC in  
Africa.  
 
The key peace-building priorities for Africa include: restoration of na-
tional political authority in countries such as: Somalia, Democratic 
Republic of Congo (DRC), Sudan and Cote d’Ivoire; post-conflict 
peace consolidation involving: Sierra Leone, Burundi, Rwanda, Gui-
nea Bissau and Liberia; transformed political leadership and good  
governance in countries such as: Zimbabwe, Kenya, Madagascar,  
Gabon, Guinea, Niger and Mauritania; and democratic and electoral 
transparency and accountability to be deepened in countries such as:  
Ghana, Nigeria, South Africa, Botswana, Benin  and Senegal. These 
peace-building priorities respond respectively to a wide range of gov-
ernance transitions that are scaled down from conflict and security 
zones such as in cluster 1; conflict transitions (cluster 2); democratic 
transitions from conflict (cluster 3); unconstitutional democratic tran-
sitions (cluster 4); and democratic and electoral consolidation also in-
dicated in cluster 5 as in Table 1 below. But above all, it is significant 
to note that all these political transitions, irrespective of the level of a 
country’s political stability and development experience one form of 
conflict or other. 
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Table 1: Peace-building Priorities in Africa 
 
Clusters Political  
Transitions 
Typology of 
Conflict 
Examples of  
States 
Peace-building  
priorities 
1 
Conflict and 
Security Zones 
Physical and 
Structural  
Violence 
Somalia, Demo-
cratic Republic of 
Congo (DRC) and 
Sudan 
Restoration of 
national political 
authority 
2 
Conflict  
Transitions 
Physical and 
Structural  
Violence 
Cote d’Ivoire Restoration of 
national political 
authority 
3 
Democratic 
Transitions from 
Conflict 
Structural  
Violence 
Sierra Leone,  
Burundi, Rwanda, 
Guinea Bissau and 
Liberia  
Post-conflict 
peace consolida-
tion  
4 
Unconstitutional 
transitions  
Structural  
Violence 
Zimbabwe, Kenya, 
Madagascar,  
Gabon, Guinea, 
Niger, Mauritania  
Transformed 
political leader-
ship and good 
governance 
5 
Democratic and 
Electoral  
consolidation 
Structural  
Violence 
Ghana, Nigeria, 
South Africa,  
Botswana, Benin, 
Senegal  
Democratic and 
Electoral trans-
parency and  
accountability 
 
Source: Authors’ Construct. 
 
It does appear that African countries will continue to remain and oscil-
late between the three operating windows designated for peace-
building responses by the PBC. But more importantly, there is a clear 
indication that more countries have lined up for peace-building sup-
port, a trend which will continue to be perpetuated in the long-term. 
One way of overcoming this challenge is to adopt a regional peace-
building strategy with mechanisms that ultimately address both physi-
cal and structural conflicts in Africa.   
 
 
 
Strategic Priorities for the Envisioned 
Future of the PBC  
For a start it is important to note that the task of managing the transi-
tion from state collapse to post-conflict stability is, without doubt, an 
arduous exercise which can not be overemphasized. While it requires 
the mobilization, motivation and utilization of all available resources 
in order to offset the long period of missed opportunities and expecta-
tions through armed conflicts, such processes demand a superior strat-
egy for a coherent peace-building outcome in the long term. Since the 
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inception of the PBC some four years ago, it has understandably been 
more visible in Africa than any other part of the world. This amplifies 
the fact that Africa has been a region of instability for which attention 
in terms of resources, capacity and coordination strategies should be 
focused.  
Regional Integrated Dimension  
Regional integrated dimension means that peace-building activities in 
Africa needs to have a coordinated approach integrated at the regional 
level. The PBC has been extending its operational activities to cover 
more countries since 2006. Starting with two countries, namely Bu-
rundi and Sierra Leone at the commencement of its operations, the 
number of countries participating on the PBA has increased sharply to 
eleven (11) by 2008. The other countries involved are Guinea-Bissau, 
Central African Republic and Comoros. The rest are Cote d’Ivoire, 
Liberia, Guinea, Kenya, Nepal and Haiti. 26 In addition to the in-
creased number of participating countries, and with the possibility of 
more countries coming on stream in the near future, especially from 
Africa, the emerging trend is that the peace-building project has so 
quickly assumed a critical regional dimension. The implication is that 
the PBC should begin to fashion out regional integrated strategies to 
its peace-building activities, especially in Africa in addition to the al-
ready existing national coordination strategies for those countries who 
are currently on its operational radar. But in creating the strategic  
regional coordination responses, care must be taken to: 
 
1. Neutralize the potential tensions that may ensue between  
regional and national ownership of peace-building program-
mes; and 
2. Distinguish the possible sources of strategic outcomes between 
regional and national impacts and its likely implications for 
capacity building, resource mobilization and impact sustain-
ability. 
 
No doubt the implications of the financial burdens of such regional 
strategic architecture will be enormous to be sustained by the PBC, the 
efficiency, economy and cost-effectiveness of resources in the appli-
cation of such regional coordination strategies cannot be overstated. 
This approach will require a bit of restructuring of the internal dynam-
ics of the current peace-building architecture. But the key challenge 
really is, given that the UN has been used to conducting country-
specific strategies in most of its peace support operations without any 
strategic inter-country and inter-regional coordination in Africa, it 
                                                 
26 UN, Report of the Secretary-General on the Peacebuilding Fund. A/63/218-S2008/522 
UN, 2008). 
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may lack both the capacity and experience in conducting regional stra-
tegies such as the one being proposed in this paper. This lack of capa-
city of the UN to undertake integrated regional coordination stems 
from the fact that in all the fourteen peace support missions scattered 
in various regions in Africa27, it is only in West Africa where coordi-
nation support capacity and strategy by the UN has been integrated. 
Such architecture is under the strategic coordination of UNOWA ba-
sed in Dakar, Senegal. Following from this, the UN will need skilled 
personnel and strategic leadership to drive the regional integrated co-
ordination strategies in Africa. The key advantage in this approach is 
that the AU and the RECs will know how to properly reconcile and 
integrate their peace-building strategies into the overarching peace-
building architecture of the UN and also to be more committed to the 
peace-building project in terms of shaping their internal structures in 
order to provide direction and leadership to peace-building activities 
in Africa.  
International Political Dynamics 
International political dynamics refers to the strategic role of the poli-
tical interests in peace-building activities. The critical concern is that 
the PBC may become politically polarized as competition for its capa-
city and resources intensifies. Like other UN agencies, the foundation 
of the PBC’s establishment is deeply entrenched in international poli-
tics where the relations among the major powers of the global politics 
determine the future of these key agencies. In effect, the procedural 
processes set out to independently appraise and dispatch peace-
building cases may be subjected to the internal dictates and pace of 
commitments by the major powers, especially the permanent members 
of the UN Security Council. Already, the structure of the PBC is 
loosely attached to the UN system as its only acts as an advisory body 
to the General Assembly and the Security Council with no apparent 
powers to directly influence strategic political decisions regarding 
peace-building activities.28  
 
The priority given to the permanent members of the UN Security 
Council over and above other considerations such as troop and finan-
cial contributing countries in making a determination on peace-
building responses may raise potential tensions among these key  
actors which may in turn derail the strategic coordination objectives of 
the PBC. In the final analysis, it will be Africa which will be greatly 
                                                 
27 See the number of Peace Support Operations in Africa in the “Annual Review of Global 
Peace Operations 2009”. Centre on International Cooperation. (London & New York: 
Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2009). 
28 Rugumanu, M. Severine,. Does the UN Peacebuilding Commission Change the Peace-
building in Africa?. Briefing Papers. (New York: FES, 2009). 
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affected by the institutional undercuts of the UN if such processes do 
happen in the future. 
 
It is important to avoid a situation whereby countries earmarked for 
peace-building sponsorship will be selected based on appropriately or 
inappropriately such countries behave in their bilateral relations to-
wards those key permanent members of the UN Security Council. 
Subsequently, the PBC may be able to function better if the reform 
agenda within the UN Security Council is allowed to be implemented. 
Even though the United States has reservations against the proposed 
reforms in the Security Council, such reforms will go a long way to 
ease the envisioned political pressure that would be mounted on the 
strategic coordination role of the PBC as it takes on more global and 
regional responsibilities.29 
Transformative Impact of Peace building 
The transformative impact of peace building is expressed as the pro-
cess of scaling up peace-building responses in ways that stimulate pro-
ductive capacities of post-conflict countries. In terms of programming 
and priority setting, it will be necessary for the PBC to envision a pol-
icy shift from security sector stabilization to economic sector integra-
tion in the long-term. Currently, the PBC seem to be operating with 
the traditional notion of peace building which prioritizes security sec-
tor stabilization over economic stimulation and social cohesion in a 
post-conflict context. But while this notion of security sector stabiliza-
tion is useful for internal security of post-conflict countries in the in-
terim, it connotes a Cold War ideological strategy in peace building 
where state security is appropriated privileged status over and above 
human development, thus emphasizing state sovereignty as an end 
state of post-conflict peace building. On the contrary, the state’s role 
has to be minimal on sovereignty while strengthened more profusely 
on human rights and civil society protection, more so in an African 
context where the notion of security is considerably being shifted from 
state security to human security. But again, shifting the long-term role 
of the PBA from security to social cohesion and economic stimulation 
will mean reducing the role of the Security Council in the policy deci-
sions of the PBC. As has been argued by the UN itself, there is a 
“growing sense that as the peace-building agenda becomes more op-
erationally focused on economic and social issues, and less on security 
issues, the added value that the [Security] Council can bring is less 
clear.”30 More preferably, the Economic and Social Council 
                                                 
29 Birenbaum, E. David, UN Reform: Progress, Prospects, and Priorities. Project on Leader-
ship and Building State Capacity. (Woodrow Wilson International Centre for Scholars, 
2007).  
30 UN, “Post-Conflict Peacebuilding”. Security Council Update Report. 2009. 
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(ECOSOC) should begin to assume more prominent role in determin-
ing peace-building options and priorities. 
 
Peace-building activities continue to be treated as humanitarian opera-
tions rather than a tool for economic take-off in the respective coun-
tries that are currently being reconstructed under the schedule of the 
PBC. In this respect, more emphasis is often put on aid, donations and 
charity that often bring in little resources as opposed to emphasis on 
trade and investment which may yield more resources to the partici-
pating countries.31 Concerns have been raised that “dependence on 
these kinds of aid is disempowering. They undermine the self-
confidence of the recipient countries’ governments and peoples, and 
erode policy space”.32 In many regards, there seem to be no strategic 
attempt at using peace building as a tool to directly stimulate industri-
alization and economic self-sufficiency in the current national coordi-
nation strategies. The conventional areas of response that prioritize 
areas such as security sector reform (SSR), disarmament and demobi-
lization among others cut across all the selected countries with none of 
the countries being used as centers of industrialized enclaves which 
will transform local and regional economies for long-term growth and 
development. More critically, the lack of investment in infrastructure 
such as energy, transportation, irrigation and technology means un-
derdevelopment and poverty will continue to undermine future peace-
building efforts in Africa. 
 
Yet another key factor which may hinder the attainment of the long-
term vision by the PBC, especially in Africa is that peace building is 
still structured in a way that reinforces the colonial legacies and the 
neo-liberal economic structures. Such structures make African coun-
tries concentrate on the production and export of raw materials that 
yielded very little foreign exchange while importing processed goods 
at higher prices from the Western countries. Such unfavorable terms 
of trade imposes on many African countries increased import bills and 
huge balance of payment deficits which in turn leads to high indebt-
edness, constituting a drain on and depletion of  national reserves and 
assets of African economies. In the recent past, trade liberalization 
policies by the IFIs opened the door to cheap imports from outside, 
and several of the cost-inefficient African industries were shut down 
in the face of increased competition. In the process, “instead of mak-
ing them [industries] more efficient in the heat of the competition, 
they simply shut down and set thousands of workers onto the 
streets.”33  This trend in economic management has not been reversed 
                                                 
31 Collier, Paul et al, Breaking the Conflict Trap: Civil War and Development Policy. (New 
York, Oxford University Press and World Bank, 2003).  
32 Tandon, Yash, Ending Aid Dependence, (Cape Town: Fahamu – Networks for Social 
Justice, 2008.).  
33 Tandon, 61. 
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in the current peace-building responses. In effect, the countries which 
are currently being sponsored by the PBC are only being assisted to 
become more integrated into the neo-liberal economic structures and 
more importantly shaping them into becoming more import and donor 
dependent in the post-conflict phase of their national development. It 
is, therefore, vital to note that so long as the World Bank and the IMF 
do not change their financial policies and the economic strategies to-
wards developing countries in Africa, more conditions will be created 
to precipitate more conflicts and underdevelopment. This will culmi-
nate in the PBC moving in a perpetual culture of vicious cycle in un-
ending peace-building coordination efforts in Africa.     
 
 
 
Strategic Conditionalities for Suc-
cessful Peacebuilding in Africa  
It is important for the PBC to match its strategic vision and capacities 
with emerging trends in African politics. The future state of the PBC 
in Africa will largely depend on a set of factors described in this sec-
tion as: the quality of strategic African leadership, visionary leader-
ship in the mediation of conflicts and transitional governance pro-
cesses. This section is devoted to a discussion on these key areas as 
conditions precipitating the success or otherwise of the PBC in Africa.  
Strategic African Leadership 
Firstly, it is important to situate the future state of affairs of the PBC 
within the emerging political context in Africa. Some African leaders 
have assumed a style of leadership that only points to an elitist and 
exclusivist rule which disconnects them from their populations. Such 
leadership style is not visionary and does not inspire trust, confidence 
and unity of purpose. Political leadership invariably is about adher-
ence to the principles of accountability, engagement, transparency, 
delivery of public goods and responsibility.34And without such key 
principles in political governance in Africa, leadership has little or no 
value of legitimacy upon which strategic purposes of sovereign  
authority can thrive. Part of the problem with African governance is 
that there has always been the tendency to equate presidency to lead-
ership. But while accepting that the two do not mean the same, they 
have conveniently been used in a way that is proving more detrimental 
to the political progress of African people. Consequently, Africa will 
                                                 
34 Maisiri, Trevor, A New Political Leadership Discharged. (African Reform Institute, 
2009). 
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continue to produce dynamic personalities emerging out of politics 
that will only emerge as presidential elites and not as leaders. This is a 
sad commentary that the region is profoundly suffering from leader-
ship crisis, at a point when it needs a visionary leadership, capable of 
mobilizing the population and directing their energies and aspirations 
from violence means of attaining power toward a common vision of 
wealth creation and development.35  
 
Because politicians see politics and state power as avenues to advance 
their self-seeking interests, they do everything, however contemptuous 
of capture and retain political power, many a times totally oblivious to 
the unpopular and injurious consequences that their actions may have 
on their populations. Recent political developments in Kenya, Zim-
babwe, Guinea Bissau, Guinea, Madagascar and Niger are all clear 
demonstrations that African politicians only seek power for its sake 
rather than applying it for the achievement of the welfare of their 
populations36. But seeking political power without a commitment to 
responsibility and accountability to the people will only make such 
self-seeking politicians presidents and not leaders.37 Peace building is 
a long-term activity and therefore requires visionary leadership to in-
spire confidence in the process in order to attain the futuristic goals set 
out to bring sustainable peace in Africa. In the next ten years to come, 
the success or otherwise of the PBC in Africa will largely depend on 
the type of political leadership that will emerge on the African conti-
nent. But more critically, much of the success of the PBC in Africa 
will require that its mandate is made more flexible to directly engage 
the political processes in Africa instead of  always remaining aloof 
only to respond when the harm had already been done. It is instructive 
to note that preventive responses in political matters in Africa are al-
ways better than knee-jerk responses to conflict situations which often 
put emphasis on security. 
Mediation of Conflicts 
Secondly, Africa’s attempts at resolving most of its political crisis, 
some of which have prompted and undermined peace-building activi-
ties in the region, have involved responses that only tended to rein-
force the status quo of always settling for nothing more than a com-
promised vision, thus lowering the capacity, incentive and standards 
that should be associated with visionary leadership in mediation dur-
ing conflict resolution efforts.38 The lack of visionary leadership in 
                                                 
35 Van, Wyk Jo-Ansie, Political Leaders in Africa: Presidents, Patrons and Profiteers. 
ACCORD :Occasional Paper Series, Vol 2: No. 1. (2007). 
36 Aning & Bah, op cit. 
37 Ibid.  
38 There have been several cases in point where both the AU’s and ECOWAS’s political 
principles have been set aside because of political expediency to engage with leaders in 
Mauritania, Guinea and Niger. 
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mediation outcomes speaks volumes about how convenient it is for 
African leaders to always rush into compromised options in critical 
instances such as peace agreements without minding to systematically 
consider the long-term repercussions of such compromised solutions 
on the envisaged peace-building activity that will ensue thereafter to 
ensure sustainable peace. In effect, such actions rather culminate in 
prolonging, spreading and multiplying peace-building responses in 
Africa. What it does to the envisioned future of the PBC is that it may 
derail the integrated strategies in peace-building coordination in  
Africa which may subsequently affect the confidence in the current 
architecture to deliver greater outcomes in the future. This may 
prompt another series of institutional reform which may be contem-
plated by the UN as a consequence to the unintended failures of the 
PBC. The PBC needs to revise its position and strategies on peace 
agreements support in Africa.   
Transitional Governance 
Following from the lack of visionary mediation outcomes in most con-
flict resolution efforts in Africa, power sharing arrangement has sud-
denly become a universal panacea to most political crisis in Africa. 
While such arrangements may be useful as a short-term measure to 
restore political stability in a post-conflict environment, it might be 
overly detrimental to peace-building efforts in the long run, princi-
pally because it serves as a political incentive and means to reward 
political actors who use unconstitutional means to achieve their politi-
cal goals.  Such practices may become catalyst for other potential 
“spoilers” who may wish to use similar means of acquiring or per-
petuating political power.39 The AU and ECOWAS’s new governance 
and security architecture clearly prohibits such unconstitutional means 
of retaining and changing governments40 but the commitment to en-
force this provision has always been lacking.41 In the few instances 
where enforcement measures have been invoked through regional 
peacekeeping and mediation efforts such as ECOWAS in Sierra Leone 
and Togo, it was fraught with regional hegemonic controversy.  
 
The PBC can be more proactive in strengthening the capacities of 
 political parties and provision of electoral support to election man-
agement bodies in order to create a leveling playing field for both in-
                                                 
39 See UN, “Report of the Secretary-General on Peacebuilding in the Immediate Aftermath 
of Conflict”. A/63/881-S/2009/304, (New York: UN, 2009). 
40 Williams, D. Paul, “From Non-Intervention to Non-Indifference: The Origins and Devel-
opment of the African Union’s Security Culture”. African Affairs. Vol. 106, No. 523. 
(2007): 253-279. 
41  See Aning, K. & Samuel Atuobi., “The Economic Community of West African States and 
the Responsibility to Protect” in Andy Knight & Frazer Egerton, (eds), The Responsibility 
to Protect (forthcoming): 2010. 
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cumbent and opposition parties while ensuring that election manage-
ment institutions retain their independence in conducting free and fair 
elections in Africa. Democratic reforms, especially in post-conflict 
countries should ensure that those who take part in transitional gov-
ernments do not directly take part in future democratic elections. Such 
provisions should be captured in peace agreements before they are 
supported by the PBC. The pursuit of criminal justice and efforts to 
end the culture of impunity in African politics are critical ways of 
building a sustainable peace in any post-conflict situations and should 
be a key priority for the PBC in Africa. However, the decision taken 
by the African leaders to suspend cooperation with the International 
Criminal Courts (ICC) on charges of war crimes and crimes against 
humanity to some African Leaders has a far reaching implication for 
future peace-building activities in Africa. Such a collective decision 
by the African leaders has again exposed them to their often compro-
mised approaches to regional peace and security matters. The decision 
may lead to a contraction in the flow of support to the PBC to finance 
its peace-building programmes in Africa. Again, it may result in a lack 
of cooperation by other state actors who genuinely believe in the doc-
trine of the ‘Responsibility to Protect’ in the strategic coordination of 
peace-building efforts by the PBC. 
 
 
 
Conclusion 
In spite of the fact that Africa has experienced endemic political inse-
curity and as a result constituted a drain on peace-building resources, 
it nevertheless provides critical opportunities and entry points for the 
institutional reform agenda required within the UN in moderating the 
way in which it responds to threats posed by state fragility and even-
tual collapse.  
 
It is therefore critical that the PBC begins to examine more critically 
the formulation and implementation of integrated regional strategies 
on peace-building coordination. Furthermore, it should also focus on 
being more proactive in its engagements with the political processes 
within the internal structures in the UN and that of Africa as well. It is 
also equally important to begin the processes of using current peace-
building strategies as pivots of industrialization to stimulate local and 
regional economic growth in Africa. Admittedly, though, it is not go-
ing to be an easy task to embark on the proposed reforms discussed in 
the paper but the proposals are worth considering if the PBC is to step 
up its strategic responses in Africa in the longer term.  
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